A Comparative Study of Business Lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers by Bouwen, Pieter
A Comparative Study of Business Lobbying
in the European Parliament, the European








Fax 0221/2767-555 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/7
E-Mail info@mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de ISSN 0944–2073
Website www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de November 2002
2 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/7
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to empirically test a theory of access that investigates the
logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the
EU multi-level system. First, I propose the theoretical framework that attempts to
explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest repre-
sentation (companies, associations and consultants) to the European Commis-
sion, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access
to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of supply and demand of
access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-
making process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have
to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. I then derive a num-
ber of specific hypotheses about the access of the aforementioned organizational
forms. These hypotheses are analyzed in an extensive empirical study of the EU
financial services sector. On the basis of 126 exploratory and semi-structured in-
terviews the hypotheses are checked across the three EU institutions.
Zusammenfassung
Ziel dieses Papers ist die empirische Prüfung einer Theorie des Zugangs, in der
untersucht wird, welche Logik hinter dem anscheinenden Ad-hoc-Lobbying-Ver-
halten bei Vertretern von Wirtschaftsinteressen im Mehrebenensystem der EU
steckt. Auf der Basis des zugrunde gelegten theoretischen Rahmens wird erläu-
tert, wie verschiedene Organisationsformen der Vertretung von Wirtschaftsinte-
ressen (Unternehmen, Verbände, Beratungsfirmen) Zugang zur Europäischen
Kommission, zum Europäischen Parlament und zum Ministerrat finden. Anhand
einer Theorie von Angebot und Nachfrage von Zugangsgütern (“access goods”)
wird herausgearbeitet, inwieweit diese Interessensvertreter Zugang zu den ge-
nannten Institutionen erhalten. Zugangsgüter betreffen Informationen, die für
den Entscheidungsprozess der EU wesentlich sind. Um Zugang zu einer EU-Insti-
tution zu erhalten, müssen die Interessensvertreter die von der jeweiligen Insti-
tution nachgefragten Zugangsgüter liefern. Den Abschluß des Discussion Papers
bildet eine Reihe von Hypothesen darüber, wie der Zugang der genannten Or-
ganisationsformen erfolgt. Die Hypothesen werden im Rahmen einer umfassen-
den empirischen Untersuchung des EU-Finanzdienstleistungssektors analysiert
und auf der Grundlage von 126 explorativen und halbstrukturierten Interviews
für die drei EU-Institutionen überprüft.
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1 Introduction
Numerous empirical studies have been undertaken during the last decade in the
field of European interest politics (Bennett 1997; Cawson 1992; Greenwood et al.
1992; Mazey/Richardson 1993; Schneider 1992; Van Schendelen 1994). One of the
major lessons that has been drawn from this literature is the diversity and com-
plexity of EU lobbying, which make reliable theoretical generalizations very diffi-
cult. Nevertheless, the extensive empirical study I present in parts III and IV of
this paper is theoretically driven and designed to test a new theoretical frame-
work for studying the interaction between business interests and the EU institu-
tions in the European Union.1
The new framework is discussed in part II. It seeks to improve our understanding
of how business interests can influence the making of EU legislation in a specific
policy area or sector. The characterization of the European Union as a regulatory
state legitimizes this exclusive focus on legislative lobbying (Majone 1994).2 Since
measuring influence is a rather problematic enterprise in political science, the fo-
cus of the analysis is not the influence of business interests but the access these
interests enjoy to the EU institutions involved in the EU legislative process. It
needs to be emphasized that access does not necessarily mean influence. Gaining
access to the EU institutions is however a necessary condition for exercising influ-
ence in the EU legislative process. Studying access is therefore considered to be a
good indicator of influence (Hansen 1991).
The theoretical framework attempts to answer the following research question:
What determines the degree of access of business interests to the European insti-
tutions? The aim being to examine which business interests (firms, associations or
consultants) have a higher/lower degree of access to specific EU institutions and
how this is to be explained. The analysis of this question allows us to tackle si-
                                                  
I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for the inter-
esting and pleasant time I have spent in Cologne and for their useful comments on earlier
versions of this paper. In particular, I would like to thank Andreas Broscheid and Jörg
Teuber for their regular comments on my work and Bernhard Kittel for his methodologi-
cal advice. I am also grateful to Wolfgang Streeck for his support and his interest in my
work. Finally, I would like to thank Astrid Dünkelmann and Christel Schommertz for
their administrative support. The author is currently a research fellow at the Max Planck
Project Group on Common Goods: Law Economics and Politics in Bonn. He can be
reached at bouwen@mpp-rdg.mpg.de.
1 For a more detailed analysis of the theoretical framework, see Bouwen (2001, 2002).
2 The analysis in this paper is confined to legislative lobbying in the first pillar of the
so-called “pillar structure” introduced by the Treaty on the European Union.
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multaneously a traditional question in the field of European interest politics:
How do business interests use the different channels available to them to lobby
the EU multi-level system? Although many authors have addressed this question
of the business lobbying strategies adopted in the EU, the answer has remained
unclear (Bennett 1997, 1999; Coen 1997; Kohler Koch/Quitkatt 1999). Further-
more, the proposed framework tries to move beyond the traditional focus in the
literature on the characterization of European interest intermediation in terms of
the pluralist or neo-corporatist interest politics paradigm (Streeck/Schmitter
1991; Gorges 1996; Falkner 1998). Important characteristics of both paradigms are
incorporated in the new approach. The pluralist emphasis on the plurality of
groups and the importance of information is combined with the corporatist at-
tention to resource exchange.
The most important innovation in the new approach is the decision to study si-
multaneously different organizational forms of business interest representation.
Not only traditional collective action but also individual company action and
third party representation by political consultants or lawyers are studied in this
paper. This is fundamentally different from the traditional literature on European
interest intermediation, which tends to focus either on collective action or on in-
dividual company action in isolation from other organizational forms (Mazey/
Richardson 1993; Coen 1997; Greenwood/Aspinwall 1998). In addition, whereas
past studies have mainly focused on lobbying in the European Commission, in
this study the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers are studied, too,
because the three institutions need to be investigated from a comparative per-
spective in order to understand the logic of interest politics at the European level.
The paper is based on extensive empirical investigations in the EU financial serv-
ices sector in two important ways. First, in order to develop the theoretical
framework, the author has conducted 63 exploratory interviews with both busi-
ness interests (21) and EU officials and politicians (42). Second, a further empiri-
cal study has been designed to test the framework. It is based on 63 additional
semi-structured interviews with officials and politicians in three EU institutions.
In the next section (part II), I propose my new framework, while the research de-
sign and methods used to test the generated hypotheses are studied in the third
section. In the fourth section, the empirical evidence is systematically analyzed
and compared across the three EU institutions. The article concludes with the im-
plications of my theoretical and empirical results for future research.
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2 A Theory of Access
The key to understanding the lobby activities of business interests in the Euro-
pean institutions is to conceive the relation between these private and public ac-
tors as an exchange relation between two groups of interdependent organiza-
tions. It is a mistake to regard business lobbying as a unidirectional activity of
private actors vis-à-vis the EU institutions. Also, the EU institutions are eager to
interact because they need close contacts with the private sector in order to fulfill
their institutional role.
The exchange models developed by sociologists in the 1960s for the study of inter-
organizational relationships constitute an interesting starting point for the analy-
sis of the interaction between business interests and public actors at the European
level (Blau 1964; Levine/White 1961: 587). Some authors have already used ex-
change theories – either implicitly (Greenwood et al. 1992) or explicitly (Buholzer
1998; Pappi/Henning 1999) – to study European interest intermediation.3 Ac-
cording to these theories, the interaction of private and public organizations can
be conceptualized as a series of inter-organizational exchanges. These models are
closely related to the resource dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978). Whereas both theoretical approaches emphasize the importance for or-
ganizations to exchange resources, resource dependency focuses more closely on
the ensuing interdependence between the interacting organizations (Pfeffer
1997: 63). According to the resource dependence perspective, organizations are
not internally self-sufficient (Aldrich/Pfeffer 1976: 83). They require resources
from the environment and therefore have to interact with those organizations or
groups in the environment who control the resources they need (Pfeffer/Salancik
1978: 258). In the context of the EU decision-making process, private and public
actors become interdependent because they need resources from each other.
2.1 Introducing “Access Goods” as a New Theoretical Concept
In order to gain an insight into the process of resource exchange between private
and public actors at EU level, it is crucial that we study the resources that are ex-
                                                  
3 Many authors have applied exchange theories to interest intermediation and interest
group politics. The exchange paradigm is a central feature of neo-corporatism (Piz-
zorno 1978; Schmitter/Streeck 1999). Network analysis focuses on inter-organiza-
tional exchange to study various forms of interest intermediation (Coleman 1990;
Knoke et al. 1996; Pappi/Henning 1999). In political economy or public choice, the
market is the model for political exchange (Becker 1983; McCormick/Tollison 1981;
Potters/Van Winden 1990).
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changed between the two groups. The resource required by private actors is “ac-
cess” to the European institutions. In return for access to the EU agenda-setting
and decision-making process, the EU institutions demand certain goods that are
crucial for their own functioning. I call these goods “access goods”. Three access
goods can be identified and have a common characteristic: information.4 The
three access goods concern three different kinds of information and can be speci-
fied as follows:
1. Expert Knowledge (EK): This access good concerns the expertise and technical
know-how required from the private sector to understand the market. This tech-
nical information is indispensable in developing effective EU legislation in a par-
ticular policy area. Example: the technical expertise provided by Barclays Bank to
help EU officials and politicians understand the particularities of the capital ade-
quacy rules for commercial banks.
2. Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI): This access good
concerns the information required from the private sector on the European En-
compassing Interest (EEI). In our sectoral approach, the EEI relates to the aggre-
gated needs and interests of a sector in the EU Internal Market. Example: the in-
formation provided by the European Banking Federation on the interests of its
members with regard to the capital adequacy rules for commercial banks.
3. Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI): This access good
concerns the information required from the private sector on the Domestic Encom-
passing Interest (DEI). In our sectoral approach, the DEI relates to the aggregated
needs and interests of a sector in the domestic market. Example: the information
provided by the Belgian Bankers Association on the interests of its members with
regard to the capital adequacy rules for commercial banks.
The importance of Expert Knowledge in the EU decision-making process has
been widely acknowledged in the literature (Pappi/Henning 1999; Radaelli 1995;
Truman 1951). The two so-called “encompassing access goods” have not been
previously identified. It is therefore necessary to define the meaning of the con-
cept “Encompassing Interest”. An interest is more encompassing when more in-
terested parties are involved in the formulation of the interest. An aggregation of
individual interests or interested parties has to take place. A national trade asso-
ciation can, for example, be said to represent an Encompassing Interest because it
is specialized in bundling the needs and interests of its member companies. When
                                                  
4 In recent public choice approaches to interest group politics, information increasingly
plays a central role in the analysis (Austen-Smith 1995; Lohman 1995; Potters/Van
Winden 1990). Mitchell and Munger (1991) give an introductory survey of these
public choice approaches. For a survey of empirical rational choice models of interest
group behavior, see Potters and Sloof (1996).
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the aggregation of interests takes place at the national sectoral level, the Domestic
Encompassing Interest is involved. For the European Encompassing Interest, in-
terests are aggregated at the European sectoral level. The “encompassingness” of
interest groups and their representativeness are positively correlated (Salisbury
1979: 222). It is also important to mention that the three access goods are related
to two crucial issues in European public policy: the issues of legitimacy and com-
pliance (Bouwen 2002: 370).
Access goods are crucial for business interests to gain access to the EU institutions.
The highest degree of access is granted to the private actors that can provide the
so-called critical resource or critical access good. The criticality of a resource for
an organization is the extent to which the organization requires the resource for
continued operation (Pfeffer/Salancik 1978: 46–47). For each EU institution, the
critical resource is identified later in this paper.
2.2 The Supply-and-Demand Scheme for Access Goods
The three access goods that have been defined play a central role in understand-
ing the exchange between private actors and the EU institutions. It is possible to
model this exchange relation as a supply-and-demand scheme for access goods.
The private actors are responsible for supplying the access goods. They only gain
access to an institution, however, if the access good provided is simultaneously
demanded by that institution.




















10 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/7
The aim of the new theoretical framework is to explain differential access of busi-
ness interests to the EU institutions. The dependent variable, YAn, indicates the
extent to which private actors have access to institution n. The supply of access
goods, YS, and the demand for access goods, YDn, are the independent variables.
It can be concluded that, in order to explain the variation of YAn, both YS and YDn
have to be studied.
2.2.1 The Supply of Access Goods
The provision of access goods is crucial for private actors in establishing an ex-
change relation with the targeted institutions at the EU level. However, not all
private interests have the same capacity to provide access goods. As the system-
atic analysis of the main organizational forms of business interest representation
will show later in this section, organizational form is the crucial variable for de-
termining the kind of access goods that can be provided. Table 1 presents the
main organizational forms that lobby activities can take in the EU:
Table 1 Organizational Forms of Business Interest Representation
Individual action Collective action Third party
National level Individual national action National association National consultant
European level Individual EU action European association Brussels consultant
Three important variables determine the firms’ choice of the organizational form
of their lobby activities. Size is a first important variable with regard to the lobby
activities of companies. Whereas large players have enough resources to under-
take individual lobbying, smaller actors often have to rely on collective action to
be able to undertake political action at different levels in the EU multi-level sys-
tem. A second major factor that determines the organizational structure of a
firm’s lobby operations is its economic strategy. The different market strategies of
national niche players and large internationally oriented firms require different
political strategies. The domestic institutional environment of the firm is the third
important variable to study in order to understand the national and European
lobbying activities of private interests (Beyers 2000: 211). A close working rela-
tionship between state administrative elites and private interests at the national
level might, for example, create a hierarchical interaction that undermines the in-
centives of private interests for direct European level action.
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While the organizational form of the business interest representation determines
the kind of access goods that can be provided, two other variables have an im-
portant impact on the quantity and the quality of the supplied access goods and
the efficiency, i.e. speed and flexibility, of the provision. Firstly, the number of lay-
ers that constitute the organizational form (firm – national association – European
association) plays an important role. The more layers are involved in the provi-
sion of the access good, the slower and less flexible the access goods can be sup-
plied (Schmitter/Streeck 1999: 76). Secondly, efficiency is also influenced by the
complexity of the internal decision-making process of the organizational form. The more
complicated the internal decision-making process is, the slower and less flexible
is the provision of access goods. This means that a hierarchically structured or-
ganizational form like a firm is likely to be more efficient than a decentralized,
democratically organized form like an association (Salisbury 1984: 67–68).
How organizational form and the two variables discussed above influence the
provision of access goods is analyzed below in the discussion of the three main
organizational forms:
1. Individual firms (at the national or EU level):
The resource asymmetry between large and small firms explains the unequal ca-
pacities they have for providing access goods. Large firms are directly active in
the market and are therefore particularly good at providing Expert Knowledge.
The hierarchical decision-making structure within firms guarantees the efficient
provision of this access good to the EU institutions.
The strategies of large firms can be regional, national or European. Large firms
with national strategies could be called national champions. To the extent that
different parties, i.e. workers, managers and shareholders, are involved in the
formulation of the firm’s interest, the national champion can provide Information
about the Domestic Encompassing Interest. The encompassingness remains lim-
ited, however, because only one national firm is involved. Large firms with a
European strategy can provide Information about the European Interest. For most
of these large European firms, though, it is difficult to claim to provide Informa-
tion about the European Encompassing Interest since only the individual firm is
involved in the articulation of the interest.
2. Associations (at national or EU level):
Associations are not as good as individual firms at providing Expert Knowledge
because they have fewer resources and have to deal with a wider range of issues.
It has become something of an orthodoxy throughout the EU institutions that
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trade association officials are “industrial civil servants” who lack the expertise
needed to inform policy formulation (Greenwood/Webster 2000:5). Because of
their multi-layered organizational structure, associations are too distant from the
market reality. The three-layer structure of the European associations’ organiza-
tional form (EU level, national level, company level) also hampers the efficient
provision of access goods.
European associations are specialized in building consensus positions by chan-
neling the different opinions of their member associations. They aggregate the
interests of their member associations that are already the result of a bundling of
needs and interests of these national associations’ member companies. This ex-
tensive consultation mechanism allows the European associations to present an
encompassing European perspective on their sector and thereby provide good
quality Information about the European Encompassing Interest. The internal de-
cision-making processes for building consensus are complex, however, and
negatively affect the efficient provision of access goods. A similar reasoning can
be applied to national associations. They represent the national sectoral interest
and can therefore provide high-quality Information about the Domestic Encom-
passing Interest. Like other associations, national associations tend to be not very
good at providing Expert Knowledge.
3. Consultants (at the national or EU level):
Consultants have a very limited capacity for providing access goods. Because
consultants do not represent their own interests, they cannot provide the two en-
compassing access goods. Moreover, they can only provide Expert Knowledge
when they are specialized in a particular policy area. In Brussels, specialized con-
sultants are exceptional, however.
Table 2 Supply of Access Goods
Best provided access good Ranking of capacities
to provide access goods
Individual firm EK EK > IDEI > IEEI
European association IEEI IEEI > EK > IDEI
National association IDEI IDEI > EK > IEEI
Consultant EK (client=individual firm)
IEEI (client=eur. Association)
IDEI (client=nat. Association)
EK > IDEI > IEEI
IEEI > EK > IDEI
IDEI > EK > IEEI
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2.2.2 The Demand for Access Goods
In order to explain the access of private actors to the EU institutions, an analysis
of the demand for access goods is also necessary. Since it is the objective of this
paper to study EU legislative lobbying, the demand for access goods is derived
from the specific role of each EU institution in the legislative process.5 The formal
powers of each institution in the EU legislative process and the timing of their
intervention in the process determine to a large extent the institutions’ demand
for access goods.
The EU institutions are to a varying extent interested in the three access goods.
From a resource dependence perspective, one would say they depend on the en-
vironment for more than one resource, i.e. access good. For each EU institution, a
number of dependencies can therefore be identified. Using a similar theoretical
framework to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Jacobs (1974) identifies the dependency
that is most problematic for an organization. This so-called “most problematic
dependency” concerns the resource from the environment on which the organi-
zation is most dependent and corresponds with the critical resource discussed
earlier in this paper. For each organization, Jacobs also develops a “rankings of
dependencies” (Jacobs 1974: 50). Because in our analysis the demand for access
goods is based on the EU institutions’ role in the legislative process, the most
problematic dependency will correspond with the demand for the access good
that is most critical for the fulfillment of their formal legislative role. Over the
next few paragraphs, I will attempt to establish the ranking of dependencies for
each EU institution and to identify the most problematic dependency.
1. The European Parliament
As a forum for discussions of political importance during the legislative process,
the European Parliament has both supranational and intergovernmental charac-
teristics. Although supranational political groups have been established in the
Parliament over time, nationality remains a relevant cleavage within the assembly
(Kreppel/Tsebelis 1999).6 The European Parliament’s role in the Community’s
                                                  
5 It is argued that the regulation of lobbying designed by the Commission and the Par-
liament has had a minimal impact so far on the patterns of interest intermediation at
the European level (McLaughlin/Greenwood 1995). While the Commission has been
in favor of self-regulation of interests, the European Parliament has established some
minimal rules. Most observers, however, agree on the limited impact of the current
rules. They will therefore not be analyzed any further in course of this paper.
6 The two authors emphasize the importance of ideology over nationality in the Euro-
pean Parliament. In their article on coalition formation in the Parliament under the
cooperation procedure, the authors find that, generally, coalitions form on the basis
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legislative procedure has increased from having, initially, no role whatsoever to
play, to having a consultative role and, ultimately, to having powers that are
more than consultative. In many important areas these powers have reached the
level of co-decision with the Council of Ministers (Corbett et al. 1995: 220; West-
lake 1994: 144). In such an instance, it is the Parliament’s task to make amend-
ments to the proposed legislation and to take decisions.
In view of the Parliament’s legislative role, its demand for Expert Knowledge is
rather limited. At this stage of the legislative process, the Commission has al-
ready drafted a detailed and often technical proposal. Although some basic Ex-
pert Knowledge is indispensable, the amount of technical market expertise
needed to amend and take decisions is much lower in the European Parliament.7
The Parliament particularly needs information that allows it to assess the legisla-
tive proposals made by the European Commission. As directly elected suprana-
tional assembly, it is the Parliament’s task to evaluate the legislative proposals
from a European perspective (Kohler-Koch 1997: 12). The specific information the
Parliament requires for this assessment is Information about the EEI. This access
good constitutes the institution’s critical resource because it provides encom-
passing private-sector information about the needs and interests in the EU inter-
nal market.
In order to understand the Parliament’s role in the legislative process, the con-
stituency orientation of the MEPs has also to be taken into account. All MEPs are
in fact elected at the national level and therefore retain important links with their
electorate back home. In order to increase their chances for re-election, MEPs
need information about their national electorate (Hansen 1991). This is why MEPs
want Information about the DEI. This access goods provides them with informa-
tion about the needs and preferences of their voters.
2. The European Commission
The Commission is considered the most supranational institution in the EU deci-
sion-making process. It is geared towards promoting common European inter-
ests, as well as promoting its own position (Rometsch/Wessels 1997: 214). The
Commission is geared towards “promotional brokerage”, trying to push the
Member States to accept policies that go beyond a purely intergovernmental con-
sensus based on the lowest common denominator. To play its role as promotional
                                                                                                                                                 
of ideology, not nationality. Nevertheless, they are also able to identify some national
groups that occasionally vote against the majority of their party group.
7 For non-market expertise the Parliament can rely on various other sources, for exam-
ple its own internal research department, Directorate General IV for Studies (Corbett
et al. 1995: 182).
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broker in the EU legislative process, the Commission needs Information about the
EEI. The Commission has a substantial interest in this access good because it can
help to identify common European interests.
The Commission plays a central role in the EU legislative process. As the analysis
in this paper is confined to legislative lobbying in the first pillar of the “pillar”
structure introduced by the TEU,8 the fundamentals of the Commission’s position
in the legislative process can be found in Article 149 of the EEC Treaty.9 The
Commission’s sole right of legislative initiative is based on Article 149(1). As
agenda-setter, the Commission has the formal right to initiate legislation and is
thus responsible for the drafting of legislative proposals. The drafting of propos-
als takes place in the first phase of the policy-making process and requires a sub-
stantial amount of expertise. Expert Knowledge is therefore the critical resource
for the Commission’s legislative work. Because of understaffing and severe
budget constraints in the Commission, the institution is dependent on external
resources to obtain the necessary expertise (Spence 1997: 71).
In the agenda-setting and policy development phase, the Commission is not in-
terested in Information about the DEI. At this early stage of the legislative proc-
ess, the domestic private interests and the interests of most Member States in the
issues at hand have not been identified yet. The DEI cannot therefore be defined
at this early stage. This applies even more so where technical subject matters are
concerned. Besides, as promotional broker, the Commission is geared towards
promoting common European interests. The institution is therefore not primarily
interested in Information about the DEI. The Commission is, however, interested
in this kind of information on an ad hoc basis, when it has, for example, to amend
its legislative proposal to achieve a compromise in the Council and the Parliament.
Information about the Domestic Interest of a particular Member State might in
this case be crucial.
3. The Council of Ministers
In stark contrast to the Commission, the Council is the most intergovernmental
institution in the EU legislative procedure. As the Union’s supreme decision-
maker, it is the forum for reconciling the distinctive purposes and powers of the
Member States. The influence of national interests prevails in the Council and it is
therefore crucial for the Member States to identify their national or domestic in-
terest. It follows that Member States retain a very strong demand for Information
                                                  
8 In the second and third pillar, the Commission has to share the right of initiative with
the Member States.
9 These have become Article 189a(1) and (2) following the Maastricht amendments.
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about the DEI. It is the Council’s critical access good because it gives the Member
States information about the needs and interests of the domestic market. Despite
its intergovernmental traits, the Council embodies the recurrent tension in the
construction of the European Union between intergovernmentalism and suprana-
tionalism. The Council’s Secretariat and its Presidency embody a sense of collec-
tive purpose and collective commitment and thereby give this intergovernmental
institution a supranational flavor (Wurzel 1996: 273; Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace
1997). This explains why despite the Council’s predominantly intergovernmental
constitution, the institution also has an interest in Information about the EEI.
The Council shares its legislative powers increasingly with the European Parlia-
ment.10 It is the Council’s task to amend and decide on legislation by reaching a
decision that is acceptable to all or, at least, to a majority (Westlake 1995: 87). Four
main legislative procedures can be identified: 1) the consultation procedure, 2)
the assent procedure, 3) the cooperation procedure and 4) the co-decision proce-
dure. The Council can influence the final shape of the legislative proposal to
varying degrees, depending on the procedure being used. When it comes to deci-
sion-making in the Council, the proposal has already been technically elaborated
and the demand for Expert Knowledge from private interests is therefore sub-
stantially reduced. To comment on or amend a proposal, a different kind of in-
formation is required than that required for the actual drafting by the Commis-
sion. At this stage of the decision-making process, the Council is more interested
in information that can facilitate the bargaining process among the Member
States.
Table 3 Demand for Access Goods
Critical resource Ranking of dependencies
European Parliament IEEI IEEI > IDEI > EK
European Commission EK EK > IEEI > IDEI
Council of Ministers IDEI IDEI > IEEI > EK
                                                  
10 In this paper, the focus is on the legislative role of the Council in the first pillar. In the
two intergovernmental pillars, the CFSP and JHA, the Council plays a crucial and
dominant role. The Council does not have to share its legislative powers with the
European Parliament in these pillars, nor are its decisions subject to interpretation by
the ECJ.
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2.3 Deriving Hypotheses: Combining Supply and Demand
In order to explain the access of business interests to the EU institutions, both the
supply and the demand for access goods have to be taken into account. Whereas
private actors need the capacity to supply access goods, the latter have to be de-
manded simultaneously by the EU institution to which the private actors want to
gain access. The analysis of the supply side shows that most private interests can
provide each of the three access goods to a varying degree. On the demand side,
the EU institutions are to a certain degree interested in the three access goods.
Combining supply and demand would generate the unsatisfactory and uninter-
esting hypothesis that most private actors have a certain degree of access to the
three EU institutions. Insights from resource dependency theory, however, allow
us to generate more specific and interesting hypotheses.
According to Pfeffer (1982), identifying an EU institution’s most problematic de-
pendency or critical resource allows one to determine to which private actors that
institution will grant the highest degree of access. He argues that organizations
will respond more to the demand of the group or organization in the environ-
ment that controls the most problematic dependency (Pfeffer 1982: 193). In terms
of the European institutions, this means that an EU institution will respond more
to the demand of a private interest – that is to say, will give more access to a pri-
vate interest – that controls the institution’s most problematic dependency or
critical resource. The private actors who can provide the highest quantity and
quality of the critical access good in the most efficient way will therefore enjoy
the highest degree of access to the EU institution. Using this logic of access en-
ables us to generate a number of specific hypotheses about access by combining
the EU institutions’ ranking of dependencies and the ranking of capacities to pro-
vide access goods on part of the different organizational forms (combining the re-
sults of Tables 2 and 3):
Table 4 Overview of Generated Hypotheses
1. Access to the European Parliament EA > NA > IF
2. Access to the European Commission IF > EA > NA
3. Access to the Council of Ministers NA
a
 > EA > IF
a NA and national champions
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3 Research Design and Methods
3.1 Three Case Studies in the EU Financial Services Sector
The EU financial services sector was chosen in order to test the generated hypo-
theses empirically. The numerous legislative measures proposed by the European
Commission since 1998 have had important distributive effects for the financial
services providers and have consequently engendered intense interaction between
these private interests and the EU public authorities through lobbying and public
consultation. The increased lobbying activity over the last few years in the EU fi-
nancial services sector makes this policy area particularly interesting for studying
the logic of business interest representation in the European Union. Europe’s po-
litical leaders focused their attention over the last decade on the construction of
the Economic and Monetary Union, but they failed to develop the regulatory in-
frastructure required for the integration of the Member States’ financial services
markets (Zavvos 1994: 27–32; Dyson/Featherstone 1999). Since the success of the
single currency would not be guaranteed without well-functioning financial mar-
kets, the European Commission devised in 1998 the so-called Financial Services
Action Plan in order to inject new momentum into the task of building a single fi-
nancial market (Mogg 1999: 11).11
The theory of access is successively applied to the European Parliament, the
European Commission and the Council of Ministers. The analysis of access in
each of the three EU institutions constitutes a separate case study. In addition, the
combined analysis of the three case studies allows the access of business interests
to be studied from a comparative inter-institutional perspective and allows us to
check whether or not the new framework is useful across the three institutions
(Eckstein, 1975: 85).12
                                                  
11 Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action. Commission Communication of
28/10/98. COM (1998) 625. In June 1998, the Cardiff European Council had asked
the European Commission to table an action plan to improve the single market in fi-
nancial services.
Financial Services – Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action
Plan. Commission Communication of 11/05/99. COM (1999) 232.
12 According to Eckstein, a comparative study is simply the study of numerous cases
along the same lines, with a view to reporting and interpreting numerous measures
of the same variables for different “individuals”. The individuals can be persons or
collectivities.
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3.2 Relative Access and Ordinal Data
When analyzing more closely the different hypotheses, it becomes clear that they
concern the relative access of the private actors to the EU institutions. The reason
why one organizational form of interest representation enjoys better access to an
EU institution than another is the real question to be addressed in this study. The
data required to test these hypotheses should therefore relate to the relative ac-
cess of the different organizational forms. Ordinal data on the degree of access of
the four organizational forms is necessary to test the hypotheses. Both public and
private actors potentially have interesting information about access. Since we are
interested in relative access, the focus of the data collection has primarily to be on
the public actors. The latter are approached by the different organizational forms
in order to gain access and are therefore in the best position to evaluate the rela-
tive access granted to the private actors. Private actors are mostly unaware of the
access enjoyed by other private interests and it is therefore extremely difficult for
them to correctly assess the relative access they have to the EU institutions.
In order to test the hypotheses, the relative access of the different organizational
forms has to be measured. It was decided to develop a set of structured questions
that would be used to obtain comparable and quantifiable data on the access of
private interests to the three EU institutions. Since we were interested in data on
relative access, the public rather than the private actors were confronted with
these questions in a series of 63 semi-structured interviews.13 While structured
questions were inserted in the semi-structured interviews in order to obtain com-
parable and quantifiable data, at the same time open questions allowed more
qualitative in-depth knowledge to be generated (King 1995: 15).14 All the inter-
views were conducted by the author alone. This helped to reduce variation in the
responses caused by the so-called interviewer effect and to minimize misinter-
pretation of the open and closed questions. The public actors focused on are those
that were judged most relevant for legislative lobbying in each of the three EU in-
stitutions. These specific public actors constitute the institutions’ most important
access point. Because of the basic functional and structural differences between
the three EU institutions, different public actors were studied in each institution.
                                                  
13 The total amount of time spent on interviewing officials and politicians in the three
institutions was 54 hours and 25 minutes.
14 A different questionnaire was devised for conducting the semi-structured interviews
in each of the three EU institutions. In order to guarantee the comparability of the
collected data, a stable core of closed questions was used in all interviews. The open
questions, however, varied not only between the different EU institutions but also
over time for the same institution. While uninteresting or resolved questions were
dropped, new open questions were regularly added to the questionnaire.
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In each of the three case studies, I identify the relevant population of public actors
and use a sample thereof to measure the access of business interests to that spe-
cific EU institution. Even though the identified populations of politicians and of-
ficials are rather small, the largest possible samples were chosen in order to
maximize the number of observations. In the European Commission (population
=29) and the Parliament (population=45), the size of the samples equals the
population. While the population of officials investigated in the Council of Min-
isters amounts to 22, the sample contains only 15 individuals. The response rate
in the Council of Ministers (93%) is clearly higher than in the European Commis-
sion (76%) and the European Parliament (60%).15 When taking the populations,
the samples and the different response rates into account, I would argue that the
results of the empirical investigation in the three institutions are representative of
the situation in the EU financial services sector.
3.3 The Method of Paired Comparison
The hypotheses generated as to the relative access of private actors to the three
EU institutions are tested on the basis of ordinal data. In order to obtain informa-
tion about the relative access of private actors, the officials and politicians were
asked during the interviews to provide information about their contacts with pri-
vate interests in the context of legislative lobbying. They were invited to establish
a ranking of their contacts with the different forms of business interest representa-
tion. The interviewees had to indicate with which of the four organizational forms
they have had contacts, taking the usefulness and the regularity of the contacts
into account. The resultant rankings indicate which organizational forms the inter-
viewees have chosen as their first, second, third and fourth choice. Tables 5, 7 and 8
below give an overview of the ordinal data that was gathered in each institution.
In order to test the hypotheses, the individual rankings provided by the inter-
viewees from the same institution have to be combined to obtain an overall or
composite ranking of the contacts of these interviewees with the different organ-
izational forms. The most straightforward method of obtaining the complete
composite ranking of the four organizational forms is to use the weighted sums of
the rank values (Guilford 1954: 180; Cooper/Emory 1995: 145).16 Because rank
                                                  
15 In the response rate of the European Commission, cabinet officials are included.
16 What are the rank values? The normal custom of assigning the greatest or highest
value a rank of 1 has been followed here. The ranks 1 through to n, however, are only
used to record the data. In the further treatment of the data, the rank numbers are re-
placed by their rank values. The rank values Ri are a series of values in exact reverse
order to the rank ri. Ri is related to ri by the simple equation Ri=n – ri + 1. In this proj-
ect the highest rank, rank 1, corresponds to rank value 4. In order to obtain the com-
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values are strictly ordinal numbers, the numerical meaning of the weighted sums
is not entirely clear. When the weighted sums are calculated, there is an implicit
assumption that the distance between the different ranks and therefore rank val-
ues is equal.17 Hence another more sophisticated method based on Thurstone’s
law of comparative judgment is used and is called the method of paired compari-
son (Thurstone 1959: 39, 67; McIver/Carmines 1981: 16).
The method of paired comparison is a one-dimensional scaling method that al-
lows ordinal scale values to be converted into interval scale values (Guilford
1954: 154; Swanborn 1993: 31). In this method, the different organizational forms
have to be evaluated by the interviewees in all the possible pairs. The result is a
number of comparative judgements. It is important to note that the interviewed
officials and politicians were not directly confronted with the paired comparisons
of the four organizational forms. Instead they were asked during the interview to
establish a complete ranking of the four organizational forms. It is no problem,
however, to turn this complete rank-order information into comparative judge-
ments for all pairs of organizational forms. If the four organizational forms,
European association (EA), national association (NA), individual company (IF)
and consultant (Cons), are ranked in the order given, then six comparative judge-
ments may readily be inferred: EA>NA, EA>IF, EA>Cons, NA>IF, NA>Cons and
IF>Cons. This approach is called the pair-comparison treatment of complete
ranks (Guilford 1954: 183).
On the basis of the resulting comparative judgements, it is possible to determine
the proportion of times each organizational form is deemed greater than every
other form. This provides additional information about the intensity of the re-
spondents’ preferences when ranking different alternatives. The calculation of the
interval scale values is based on this additional data.18 The F-matrix, the P-matrix
and the Z-matrix required for calculating the interval scale values of the different
organizational forms, along with more details about the data, can be found in the
appendix where these matrices are calculated (Guilford 1954: 154–163; Swanborn
1993: 31–45). The important advantage of the paired comparison scaling method
is that it not only helps to establish the composite ranking but it also assists in
determining more precisely the different degrees of access of the organizational
forms to the various EU institutions.
                                                                                                                                                 
posite ranking, the resulting rank values (4, 3, 2, 1) are weighted for each organiza-
tional form with the frequencies with which the respondents chose the organiza-
tional form as their first, second, third or fourth choice.
17 The different intensities of interviewees’ preferences for different organizational
forms and therefore the different distances that might exist between consecutive
ranks are not taken into account by the method of the weighted sums.
18 This data should therefore better reflect the distance between the intensities of the
interviewees’ preferences for different organizational forms.
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4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The European Parliament
A closer look at the European Parliament allows us to identify the parts that are
relevant when it comes to legislative lobbying: the plenary session, the special-
ized committees, the committee secretariats, the hearings, the college of quaestors
and the intergroups (Westlake 1994). A detailed investigation shows that the spe-
cialized committee system is the most relevant part of the Parliament for studying
legislative lobbying. It constitutes the supranational assembly’s most important
point of access. Despite the fact that the plenary session has the final say on legis-
lation, most of the Parliament’s legislative work takes place in its specialized com-
mittees (Bowler/Farell 1995; Neuhold 2001: 3). All legislative proposals and other
legislative documents must be considered in the committees, and the bulk of the
legislative process under all legislative procedures takes place in the committee
sessions. Because of our empirical focus on the European financial services sector,
one specific committee is studied in this paper: the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs CEMA). Annex VI of the EP’s rules of procedure spells out that
the CEMA is responsible for matters relating to financial services (Article 51 (2) of
the EC Treaty) and aspects related to the prudential supervision and monitoring
of such services. The 45 full members of the CEMA were therefore identified as
the relevant population to be investigated. All the full members were included in
the sample of persons that were invited to participate in the semi-structured in-
terviews. Between June 2000 and February 2001, the author conducted 27 inter-
views with full members of the CEMA.19 On average, each interview lasted about
40 minutes.
Table 5 below summarizes the rankings provided by the 27 MEPs. The table con-
tains the frequencies with which MEPs have chosen a particular organizational
form as their first, second, third or fourth choice.
The result of the χ2-test and the p-value clearly indicate that there is a relationship
between the two variables in the table.20 The Cramer coefficient of association
specifies that there is indeed a rather strong association between organizational
form and the degree of access.21
                                                  
19 In 4 of the 27 interviews, the interviewee was the full member’s chief assistant in-
stead of the MEP.
20 It should be noted that the conditions are satisfied to apply the chi-square test. Since
the degree of freedom is greater than 1, no more than 20 percent of the cells should
have an expected frequency of less than 5, and no cell should have an expected fre-
quency of less than 1 (Siegel/Castellan 1988: 199). These conditions are met here for
the calculation of chi-square.
21 The Cramer coefficient is useful when only categorical data on the variables is avail-
Bouwen: Business Lobbying 23
A closer look at the first column of Table 5 seems to confirm the proposed hypo-
theses concerning access to the European Parliament. Whereas a majority of MEPs
have preferential contact with the European associations (12), they have clearly
less contact with national associations (9) and individual companies (4) respec-
tively. It would, however, be premature to conclude only on the basis of the
MEPs’ first choice that European associations have effectively better access than
national associations and individual companies. The information contained in the
three other columns (second, third and fourth choice) cannot be disregarded and
has to be taken into account simultaneously. The method of paired comparison is
therefore used to calculate, on the basis of the 27 individual rankings, the com-
posite ranking of the MEPs’ contacts with private interests (Guilford 1954: 154;
Swanborn 1993: 31). The F-matrix, the P-matrix and the Z-matrix required for cal-
culating the interval scale values of the different organizational forms can be
found in the appendix. The resulting values are reported in Table 6.
The obtained overall ranking of organizational forms confirms the hypotheses
that were generated regarding access to the European Parliament. European asso-
ciations (1.71) do have a higher degree of access to the Parliament than national
associations (1.69) and the latter have a higher degree of access than individual
firms (0.80) and consultants (0.00). Consultants have substantially lower degree of
access than individual firms and are thus the least successful in securing access to
the Members of the CEMA. The difference between the interval scale value cal-
culated for the collective forms of interest representation, i.e. the European and
                                                                                                                                                 
able. Like the Pearson correlation coefficient, the Cramer coefficient has a maximum
value of 1 and the coefficient will be equal to 0 when the two variables are independ-
ent. Unlike the Pearson coefficient, the Cramer coefficient cannot be negative (Siegel/
Castellan 1988: 227).
Table 5 MEPs’ Preferential Contactsa
Organizational Form First Choice Second Choice Third Choice Fourth Choice
European Association 12 9 3 1
National Association 9 13 3 0
Individual Firm 4 2 13 6
Consultant 0 1 6 18
No Answer 2 2 2 2
Total 27 27 27 27
df=9, χ2 =72.98, p=smaller than 0.001 and the Cramer Coefficient C=0.493
a The "No" answers are not included for the calculation of χ2 and the Cramer coefficient and therefore N=25.
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national associations on the one hand and the individual firms or consultants on
the other, is rather large. MEPs clearly prefer to talk to lobbyists from representa-
tive organizations irrespective of the level of interest aggregation (national/
European). The distance between the values calculated for European and the
national associations is in contrast very small (0.02). It follows that European and
national associations have a similar degree of access to the European Parliament.
This interesting result points at the successful “Europeanization” of national
interests associations in recent decades (Bouwen, forthcoming).
4.2 The European Commission
The functional differentiation of the European Commission into various Director-
ates-General aims at providing specialized technical and administrative know-
how in various policy sectors (Nugent 2001: 135). In several legislative initiatives,
however, more than one Directorate-General is involved. The Internal Market DG
can be identified as the leading Commission Directorate-General in the area of EU
financial services. It is the part of the European Commission that is most relevant
to study in order to understand business lobbying in that policy area.22 In addi-
tion, so-called non-comitology consultative committees are identified as the most
important access point for private interests. In contrast with expert and comitol-
ogy committees, individual firms and interest groups are allowed to participate
directly in these committees (Schäfer 1996). Because non-comitology consultative
committees are not established for each legislative initiative, it would be wrong to
                                                  
22 Whereas the Internal Market DG is always involved in the financial services legisla-
tion, sometimes also the Economic and Monetary Affairs DG or the Health and Con-
sumer Protection DG are involved. It is logical, for example, that where retail finan-
cial services are concerned, the Internal Market DG collaborates closely with the
Consumer Protection DG.
Table 6 Interval Scale Values Based on Paired Comparison and Composite Rankinga
EP EC CM
EA 1.71 2.16 0.10
NA 1.69 1.12 1.91
IF 0.80 1.80 1.46
Cons 0.00 0.00 0.00
Composite Ranking EA > NA> IF> Cons EA > IF > NA > Cons NA > IF > EA > Cons
a The same composite rankings are obtained when using the weighted sums of the rank values. This is an
instance of successful methodological triangulation (Denzin 1978).
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study only officials that participate in these committees. Since officials not sitting
on these committees can also be important lobbying targets in the DG, all officials
directly involved in the Commission’s legislative activities are studied in this pa-
per. Based on the Commission’ internal “Guide de Service” 29 high and low
Commission officials directly involved in preparatory legislative activities have
been identified in Directorate C, i.e. the Directorate responsible for financial
services in the Internal Market DG. It was decided to include all 29 officials in the
sample of people that would be invited to participate in the semi-structured in-
terviews. In May 2001, the author conducted 22 interviews with high and low of-
ficials of Directorate C of the Internal Market DG. On average, the interviews
with the officials lasted about 51 minutes.
Table 7 shows the data that has been gathered among the officials in the Euro-
pean Commission.
Table 7 Directorate C Officials’ Preferential Contacts
Organizational form First Choice Second Choice Third Choice Fourth Choice
European association 15 4 3 0
National association 1 7 11 3
Individual firm 6 11 5 0
Consultant 0 0 3 19
No answer 0 0 0 0
Total 22 22 22 22
df=9, χ2 =90.51, p=smaller than 0.001 and the Cramer coefficient C=0.585
The χ2-test and its p-value show that there is a relationship between the different
organizational forms of business interest representation and their degree of ac-
cess.23 The Cramer coefficient of association indicates that there is a strong asso-
ciation between the two variables in the table. In order to calculate the composite
ranking of the officials’ contacts with private interests, the data in the four col-
umns of Table 7 have to be taken into account simultaneously. The interval scale
values used to build the composite ranking are again calculated on the basis of
the method of paired comparison.24 The results of the calculations can be found
in Table 6.
                                                  
23 It should be noted that the conditions are satisfied to apply the chi-square test (Siegel/
Castellan 1988: 199).
24 The F-matrix, the P-matrix and the Z-matrix required for calculating the interval
scale values of the different organizational forms can be found in the appendix.
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The obtained overall ranking and the interval scale values both confirm and dis-
confirm some of the proposed hypotheses. The hypothesis of the privileged access
of individual firms (1.80) to the European Commission has been disconfirmed.
The results show that, on the contrary, it is European associations (2.16) that have
the highest degree of access to the European Commission. Taking the frequent
critique regarding the effectiveness of European associations into account, this is
an interesting finding (McLauglin/Jordan 1993: 122; Mazey/Richardson 1996:
207). European federations are often considered to be internally divided, poorly
resourced and unable to respond quickly to Commission requests for information.
In addition, they are criticized for their cumbersome internal decision-making
machinery. The results, however, show that European associations are not only
formally the preferential partners of the European Commission; they also effec-
tively enjoy the highest degree of access to the Commission.25 However, it is im-
portant to point out that the difference in degree of access between European as-
sociations and individual companies is not very large (0.36). As predicted, na-
tional associations (1.12) and consultants (0.00) have the lowest degree of access
to the Commission. This confirms the hypothesis that these two organizational
forms have the lowest degree of access to Directorate C officials. It can be con-
cluded that, although individual firms have a slightly lower degree of access to
the European Commission than European associations, individual companies
clearly have better access than both national associations and consultants.
4.3 The Council of Ministers
Only two of the more than twenty sectoral formations of the Council are impor-
tant in our study of legislative lobbying in the European financial services sector:
the Internal Market Council and the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers
(ECOFIN). Furthermore, a thorough analysis of the Council machinery allows the
administrative and governmental structures in the national capitals to be identi-
fied as the most important locus for lobbying the EU Member States within the
Council framework. The starting point of the argument is that the national nego-
tiating position of Member States in the Council is determined in the national
capital by the ministers and their cabinet.26 Since the Member States have dele-
                                                  
25 The European (con-)federations have been formally recognized as preferential inter-
locutors of the European Commission in the Communication on “An open and struc-
tured dialogue between the Commission and special interest groups” (93/C63/02).
26 It is important to point out that it is in the capital’s own interest to involve the staff of
the permanent representation in determining the negotiating position and drawing
up the instructions for the permanent representative and his attachés. Based on their
in-depth knowledge of the legislative process and their familiarity with the subject
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gated authority to their EU permanent representatives so they might negotiate on
their behalf in Brussels, there is a potential risk of bureaucratic drift (Mnookin/
Susskind 1999). The Member States, however, have devised a number of mecha-
nisms in order to control agency behavior (Kiewit/McCubbins 1991: 27). The
regular exchange of information, the participation of national experts in the
Council working groups and the so-called EU coordinating units are effective in-
struments by which to monitor the activities of the permanent representatives
and attachés in Brussels (de Zwaan 1995: 31/99). These control mechanisms re-
duce agency losses because they are successfully combined with the ability of the
national capital to sanction the agent in the event of shirking. However, instead of
taking the important group of financial services officials in the fifteen national
capitals as the population to be investigated, a less resource-intensive approach
has been adopted. It was decided to identify the group of 22 financial attachés
working for the fifteen permanent representations of the Member States in Brus-
sels as the relevant population of officials to be studied in order to analyze access
to the Council.27 It was considered legitimate to use the attachés as an indicator to
measure the access of business interests at the national level because they are well
informed about the lobbying that takes place in the national capital.28 With the
aim of obtaining data on each Member State, a sample of 15 attachés was taken
from the population of 22. In March and April 2001, the author was able to con-
duct 14 interviews, each of them lasting on average 1 hour and 12 minutes.
Table 8 below shows the rankings provided by the 14 financial attachés as to the
preferential contacts of the national officials in the capital city. The table contains
the frequencies with which national officials chose a particular organizational
form as their first, second, third or fourth choice.
The χ2-test and the p-value indicate that there is a relationship between the two
variables in the table.29 Furthermore, the Cramer coefficient of association sug-
                                                                                                                                                 
matter, the officials of the permanent representation can assist the national authori-
ties in establishing a position on the topics which are on the Council’s agenda.
27 The financial attachés are responsible for the Council negotiations with regard to fi-
nancial services issues in Brussels. Whereas in most countries one attaché is respon-
sible for the financial services negotiations, sometimes the task is divided among two
or three attachés.
28 The very close links between the financial attachés in the permanent representations
in Brussels and their counterparts in the national administrations at home justifies
the choice of this alternative population. In addition to the fact that the large majority
of attachés have at least daily contacts with the national officials responsible for fi-
nancial services at home, most financial attachés have previously worked in the na-
tional administration in the capital city.
29 It should be noted that the circumstances are not ideal for applying the chi-square
test. Since the degree of freedom is greater than 1, no more than 20 percent of the
cells should have an expected frequency of less than 5, and no cell should have an
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gests a rather strong association between organizational form and the degree of
access. The data in the four columns of Table 8 are necessary in order to calculate
the overall ranking of the national officials’ contacts with business interests. The
interval scale values used to construct the composite ranking are calculated using
the method of paired comparison.30 The results are reported in Table 6.
According to the results in Table 6, national associations (1.91) and individual
firms (1.46) have clearly the highest degree of access to the Council of Ministers.
This result corroborates the proposed hypotheses regarding access to the Council
when these individual firms are national champions.31 Other firms are hypothe-
sized to have the lowest degree of access to the Council. Furthermore, the results
show that European associations (0.10) have a lower degree of access to the
Council than national associations (1.91) as predicted by the proposed hypothe-
ses. Consultants (0.00) have clearly the worst access to the Council of Ministers.
The distance between the values calculated for national associations and national
champions on the one hand and those calculated for European associations on the
other hand is rather large.
                                                                                                                                                 
expected frequency of less than 1 (Siegel/Castellan 1988: 199). Since not all these
conditions are met, it is difficult to interpret the results of the chi-square test.
30 The F-matrix, the P-matrix and the Z-matrix required for calculating the interval
scale values of the different organizational forms can be found in the appendix.
31 Individual firms that are not national champions cannot provide Information about
the Domestic Encompassing Interest and therefore do not gain preferential access to
the Council of Ministers.
Table 8 National Officials’ Preferential Contacts
Organizational form First Choice Second Choice Third Choice Fourth Choice
European association 0 1 7 6
National association 8 6 0 0
Individual firm 6 6 1 1
Consultant 0 1 6 7
No answer 0 0 0 0
Total 14 14 14 14
Df=9; χ2 =42.8; p=smaller than 0.001 and the Cramer coefficient C=0.504
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4.4 Comparative Case Study Analysis
Since the hypotheses derived for each of the three main EU institutions in the
theoretical chapter make predictions about the relative access of different busi-
ness interests to that specific institution, a comparative research program de-
signed to test the hypotheses is, strictly speaking, not necessary.32 Having tested
the hypotheses on relative access in each of the previous case studies, it remains
nonetheless interesting to reassess the hypotheses from an inter-institutional
comparative perspective. It is necessary to calculate the relative access values of
the different organizational forms of business interest representation across the
three EU institutions before a systematic comparison can be undertaken.33 The
resulting percentages are reported in Graph 1 below.
From a comparative inter-institutional perspective, individual firms have a
higher degree of access to the European Commission (34%) and the Council (37%)
than to the European Parliament (20%). It is important to point out that different
kinds of firms are concerned in the Commission and the Council. While the indi-
vidual firms that have access to the European Commission are mostly non-national
companies, access of firms to the Council of Ministers is mainly restricted to na-
tional champions. Whereas it is the important demand of Commission officials
for Expert Knowledge that explains the access of firms to the European Commis-
sion, it is the national officials’ demand for Information about the DEI that guar-
antees the access of individual companies to the Council of Ministers.
National associations have clearly proportionally a higher degree of access to the
Council of Ministers (43%) than to the Parliament (37%) and the Commission
(21%). These results are not surprising because Information about the DEI has
only been identified in the Council of Ministers as the most demanded and there-
fore critical access good that can be optimally provided by national associations.
In addition, the data in the graph shows that European associations have a much
higher degree of access to the European Parliament (38%) and the European Com-
mission (43%) than to the Council of Ministers (11%). While the high access of
European associations to the Parliament and the low access to the Council follow
logically from the hypothesized demand for access goods in the two institutions,
                                                  
32 The hypotheses make statements for each EU institution about the relative access of
private actors to that institution without comparing this access with the actors’ access
to other EU institutions.
33 The relative access value is calculated by taking the column marginals (sigmas) of the
F-matrix and dividing them by the total number of pairs (N*6). Example:
Relative access of EA to the EP=57/25*6=38%
Relative access of NA to the EP=56/25*6=37%
Relative access of IF to the EP=29/25*6=20%
Relative access of Cons to the EP=8/25*6=5%
30 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/7
the relatively high degree of access of European associations to the European
Commission is more surprising. Probably, the Commission’s demand for Infor-
mation about the EEI has been somewhat underestimated when deriving the de-
mand for access goods in part II. Finally, the limited capacity of consultants to
provide access goods explains their very low degree of access to the three EU in-
stitutions (Parliament=5%, Commission=2% and Council=9%).
5 Conclusion
Even though some of the proposed hypotheses have been disconfirmed, the re-
sults of the empirical study indicate that the supply-and-demand scheme of ac-
cess goods is a useful instrument for understanding the access of the different
forms of business interest representation to the European institutions. Rather than
striving for the complete confirmation of all the hypotheses derived from the the-
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ory of access, it is the aim of this paper to propose an original and innovative per-
spective for the analysis of the social reality of European interest politics.
The theoretical and empirical results of this paper have two interesting normative
implications. First, the new framework can be used to derive concrete strategic
advice for corporate lobbying in the EU. Although often practical lobbying tech-
niques and methods are discussed in the existing literature on European interest
politics, lobbying strategies based on a clear theoretical conception of the lobby-
ing process at the European level are scarce. The analysis of lobbying strategies in
the EU has mostly been restricted to describing the various channels available to
private interests (Averyt 1977; Greenwood et al. 1992: 22; Bennett 1997, 1999;
Coen 1997; Kohler-Koch/Quittkat 1999). With the theory of access, an attempt is
undertaken to establish a theoretical framework that can be used to develop con-
crete strategies for private actors to gain access to the EU institutions. The theory
makes an explicit link between the organizational characteristics of private inter-
est representation and the capacity of this representation to provide access goods
and consequently gain access to the EU institutions. This important insight sug-
gests that private interests can gain access to the EU decision-making process by
carefully managing the organizational characteristics or organizational form of
their interest representation both at home and in Brussels. Since certain channels,
i.e. certain organizational forms, give better access to certain institutions than to
others, private interests have to combine different channels in order to success-
fully gain access to the EU legislative process. The logic of access thereby at-
tempts to answer the traditional question in EU interest politics as to the logic be-
hind the use of different channels to lobby the EU institutions.
Second, the theoretical and empirical results of this paper provide a solid basis for
a systematic discussion of private interest consultation in the EU polity. Starting
from the current EU inter-institutional balance and business interest constellation,
the theory of access points to structural interaction patterns between business in-
terests and the EU institutions based on inter-organizational resource exchanges.
It is important that this structural interdependence between public and private
actors is taken into account when discussing new forms of private interest con-
sultation at the European level. The logic of access can thereby make a valuable
contribution to the current debate on the organization of private interest consul-
tation as discussed in the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance.34
Finally, it is important to discuss the implications of the new framework for fu-
ture research. Although the framework has been tested in the EU financial serv-
ices sector, insights from the new framework might be useful for the analysis of
business lobbying in other sectors. Sectoral specificities enter the theoretical
                                                  
34 Brussels, 25.7.2002., COM (2001), 428 final.
32 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/7
framework indirectly and can be accommodated within the new framework.
They influence the size of the firms that are active within the sector, the economic
strategies of the firms and the domestic associational structures in which these
firms participate. The latter three variables have been identified in the theoretical
framework as determinants of the organizational form of interest representation.
It can be concluded that the new framework takes sectoral specificities into account
through their impact on these three variables. Furthermore, it would be interest-
ing to investigate whether the theory of access could be useful for the study of
non-business interests or non-legislative lobbying (Pollack 1997). More impor-
tantly, it might be possible to adapt the framework to either the national level or
the international level. Instead of an in-depth analysis of the EU institutions to
derive the demand for access goods, the specific national or international institu-
tional setting would have to be taken into account.
In addition, the theory of access might also provide new insights into the theory
of interest group formation and maintenance (Olson 1965; Wilson 1973; Moe
1980). Interest group formation could be analyzed from the perspective of the ca-
pacity of interest groups and other organizational forms to provide access goods.
I would argue that an important reason why both the traditional forms of collec-
tive action and a number of new collective fora have been established is that they
allow private interests to provide new and/or better access goods and to provide
them in a more efficient way. Interest groups and other organizational forms offer
private interests the opportunity to collaborate in the provision of access goods.
They can thereby increase the capacity of the latter to gain access to the EU insti-
tutions.
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Appendix: Calculating Interval Scale Values
European Parliament
The F-matrix of frequencies
This matrix contains all the frequencies fij whereby f indicates how many times
the respondents have chosen column-stimulus Si over row-stimulus Sj. The diago-
nal remains empty. The columns have to be ranked so that the sum of the col-
umns increases from left to right (Swanborn 1993: 37).
Cons IF NA EA
Cons – 19 24 24
IF 6 – 20 20
NA 1 5 – 13
EA 1 5 12 –
Σ 8 29 56 57
The P-matrix of proportions
The F-matrix is transformed in the P-matrix by dividing all the frequencies fij by
the total number of respondents, N=25. The P-matrix numbers represent the pro-
portion of respondents that prefer Si to Sj. All the values on the diagonal become
0.500 (Swanborn 1993: 38). Note that pij + pji=1. The proportions are interpreted
as probabilities.
Cons IF NA EA
Cons 0.500 0.760 0.960 0.960
IF 0.240 0.500 0.800 0.800
NA 0.040 0.200 0.500 0.520
EA 0.040 0.200 0.480 0.500
Σ 0.820 1.660 2.740 2.780
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The Z-matrix
The probabilities of the p-values are associated with a cumulative normal distri-
bution with mean zero and unit variance, which produces the scale. In fact, the p-
values of the P-matrix are changed into the z-values of the Z-matrix by using the
normal-curve tables (Guilford 1954: 161). When p is greater than 0.500, zij receives
a positive sign; when p is less than 0.500 zij receives a negative sign. The upper-
right portion of the matrix is numerically identical to the lower left portion except
for the algebraic sign. Any zij represents an estimate of the distance, Di–Dj, where
the latter are the as yet unknown scale positions of the stimuli Si and Sj.
D1−D2 is estimated to be –0.70, whereas D2−D1 is estimated to be 0.70. The value
0.70 is an estimate of the distance directly obtained from the single proportion
representing the direct comparison between S1=Cons and S2=IF. These two
stimuli are, however, also compared with all the other stimuli (NA and EA).
When they are paired with other stimuli, they can give additional information
about the estimated distance between the two stimuli. The best approximation of
the distance between S1=Cons and S2=IF is obtained by taking the average of all
the estimated distances. Since the mean of the differences (=distances) is equal to
the difference between the means, the same result can be obtained by adding the
columns first and calculating the means. The distance between S1 and S2 is then
the difference between the calculated means. The means themselves will serve as
scale values.
The sums of the columns of the Z-matrix are shown in the table (Σ). The means
are calculated in the row below by dividing by the number of rows in the table (Σ/
#rows). These means may be taken as scale values whose mean is arbitrarily the
zero point of the new scale as a consequence of the procedure that has been fol-
lowed. If one wishes to eliminate the negative signs, one can assign the value zero
to the lowest stimulus (Cons), which requires us to add to each mean a positive
number equal to the absolute value of the mean of the lowest stimulus (+ value
1.05). The result is the final interval scale values on the bottom line of the Z-
matrix.
Cons IF NA EA
Cons +0.00 +0.70 +1.75 +1.75 +4.2
IF −0.70 +0.00 +0.85 +0.85 +1
NA −1.75 −0.85 +0.00 +0.05 −2.55
EA −1.75 −0.85 −0.05 +0.00 −2.65
Σ −4.20 −1 +2.55 +2.65 −0.00
Σ /#rows −1.05 −.25 +0.64 +2.65 −0.00
Int. Scale 0.00 0.80 1.69 1.71 –
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European Commission
The F-matrix of frequencies
Cons NA IF EA
Cons – 19 22 22
NA 3 – 16 19
IF 0 6 – 15
EA 0 3 7 –
Σ 3 28 45 56
The P-matrix of proportions
Cons NA IF EA
Cons 0.500 0.864 1.000 1.000
NA 0.136 0.500 0.727 0.864
IF 0.000 0.273 0.500 0.682
EA 0.000 0.136 0.318 0.500
Σ 0.636 1.773 2.545 3.046
Because of the so-called extreme proportions in the table (1.000 and 0.000), the
continuity correction is applied (Guilford 1954: 163; Swanborn 1993: 47). This
means concretely that proportion p=F/N, whereby N =22 is replaced by:
1. p=F + 0.5/N when p < or=0.02
2. p=F – 0.5/N when p > or= 0.02
The application of the continuity correction gives the following corrected P-matrix:
Cons NA IF EA
Cons 0.500 0.864 0.977 0.977
NA 0.136 0.500 0.727 0.864
IF 0.023 0.273 0.500 0.682
EA 0.023 0.136 0.318 0.500
Σ 0.682 1.773 2.522 3.023
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The Z-matrix
Cons NA IF EA
Cons +0.00 +1.10 +2.00 +2.00 +5.10
NA −1.10 +0.00 +0.60 +1.10 +0.60
IF −2.00 −0.60 +0.00 +0.47 −2.13
EA −2.00 −1.10 −0.47 +0.00 −3.57
Σ −5.10 −0.60 +2.13 +3.47 −0.00
Σ /#rows −1.27 −0.15 +0.53 +0.89 −0.00
Int. Scale 0.00 1.12 1.80 2.16
Council of Ministers
The F-matrix of frequencies
Cons EA IF NA
Cons – 7 13 14
EA 7 – 12 14
IF 1 2 – 8
NA 0 0 6 –
Σ 8 9 31 36
The P-matrix of proportions
Cons EA IF NA
Cons 0.500 0.500 0.930 1.000
EA 0.500 0.500 0.857 1.000
IF 0.070 0.143 0.500 0.571
NA 0.000 0.000 0.429 0.500
Σ 1.070 1.143 2.716 3.071
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Because of the so-called extreme proportions in the table (1.000 and 0.000), the
continuity correction is applied (Guilford 1954: 163; Swanborn 1993: 47). This
means concretely that proportion p=F/N, whereby N=14 is replaced by:
3. p=F + 0.5/N when p < or= 0.02
4. p=F – 0.5/N when p > or=0.02
The application of the continuity correction gives the following corrected P-matrix:
Cons EA IF NA
Cons 0.500 0.500 0.930 0.977
EA 0.500 0.500 0.857 0.977
IF 0.070 0.143 0.500 0.571
NA 0.023 0.023 0.429 0.500
Σ 1.093 1.166 2.716 3.025
The Z-matrix
Cons EA IF NA
Cons +0.00 +0.00 +1.48 +2.00 +3.48
EA +0.00 +0.00 +1.07 +2.00 +3.07
IF −1.48 −1.07 +0.00 +0.18 −2.37
NA −2.00 −2.00 −0.18 +0.00 −4.18
Σ −3.48 −3.07 +2.37 +4.18 −0.00
Σ /#rows −0.87 −0.77 +0.59 +1.05 −0.00
Int. Scale 0.00 0.10 1.46 1.92 –
